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Abstract 
An uncollateralized swap hedged back-to-back by a CCP swap is used to introduce 
FVA. The open IR01 of FVA, however, is a sure sign of risk not being fully hedged, a 
theoretical no-arbitrage pricing concern, and a bait to lure market risk capital, a practical 
business concern. By dynamically trading the CCP swap, with the liability-side 
counterparty provides counterparty exposure hedge and swap funding, we find that the 
uncollateralized swap can be fully replicated, leaving out no IR01 leakage. The fair value 
of the swap is obtained by applying to swap’s net cash flows a discount rate switching to 
counterparty’s bond curve if the swap is a local asset or one’s own curve if a liability, and 
the total valuation adjustment is the present value of cost of funding the risk-free price 
discounted at the same switching rate. FVA is redefined as a liquidity or funding basis 
component of total valuation adjustment, coherent with CVA, the default risk component.  
A Longstaff-Schwartz style least-square regression and simulation is introduced to 
compute the recursive fair value and adjustments. A separately developed finite 
difference scheme is used to test and find regression necessary to decouple the discount 
rate switch. Preliminary results show the impact of counterparty risk to swap hedge 
ratios, swap bid/ask spreads, and valuation adjustments, and considerable errors of 
calculating CVA by discounting cash flow or potential future exposure. 
 
Key words: Uncollateralized swap, CCP swaps, counterparty risk, liability-side pricing, 
coherent CVA and FVA, FVA, CVA, swap hedging, swap pricing. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Counterparty credit risk of swaps is well studied in both pricing (Duffie and 
Huang 1996) and econometrics (Duffie and Singleton 1997). Pre-crisis studies, however, 
focus on the default risk of the swap counterparties (Collin-Dufresne and Solnik 2001, 
and Liu et al 2006), as derivatives financing cost only manifests its impact during the 
2007-2009 global financial crisis. FVA (funding valuation adjustment) has since become 
the main thread of a broader subject of funding cost’s impact on derivatives pricing and 
valuation. In particular, following the industrywide adoption of OIS discounting for fully 
collateralized derivatives, uncollateralized trades pricing and valuation adjustments prove 
to be a much controversial and involving problem. 
A common theme when introducing FVA of an uncollateralized customer swap is 
to consider a back-to-back swap with a fully collateralized swap clearing facility (CCP, 
Central Counterparty) member firm. The CCP swap is of the exact terms and notional as 
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the customer swap and is assumed to have hedged the former so that the net economic 
effect would be that of making a loan with the customer swap as collateral. A bank, for 
instance, has to post cash-like collateral to the CCP when the customer swap is in-the-
money (ITM), and the financing cost of the collateral is defined as FVA, here a cost thus 
FCA (funding cost adjustment). An FVA benefit occurs when the swap is out-of-the-
money (OTM) as the bank gets cash from the CCP. 
While the back-to-back CCP swap serves as a perfect cash flow hedge, it is 
nevertheless imperfect from the risk point of view, as FVA itself bears unhedged interest 
rate sensitivity. Green and Kenyon (2014), for example, calculates the open IR01, which 
would attract market risk capital2. The uncollateralized swap is not fully replicated by the 
CCP swap and the FVA-adjusted fair value cannot be claimed arbitrage-free. In practice, 
counterparty default aware payoffs are specified in an ad-hoc manner and discounted at 
the risk free rate to arrive at various valuation adjustments. There is however no in-depth 
discussion on whether the risk-free price when added with all valuation adjustments is 
indeed arbitrage-free (Bielecki and Rutkowski 2013). 
Burgard and Kjaer (2011, 2013) present a rigorous micro-economic analysis of an 
uncollateralized option dynamically hedged with underlying stocks and both 
counterparties’ debt instruments. Because the funding arrangement and own default risk 
hedge are made from the dealer’s own perspective, the resulted fair value violates the law 
of one price (LOP), a criteria of no-arbitrage pricing, and thus can only be viewed as 
private value (Hull and White 2012). Green and Kenyon (2014) take the private valuation 
approach a step further by incorporating a regulatory capital charge into the fair value, 
and later argue that the risk neutral pricing principle no longer applies (Kenyon and 
Green 2014). 
In a departure from this stream of literature, Lou (2015a) allows the party on the 
liability side to hedge its counterparty’s exposure by depositing cash outside of the 
derivatives netting set with the credit risk mitigation effect realized by the Set-Off 
provision of the ISDA Master Agreement or by common laws.  The deposit also becomes 
a source of funding for the derivative. This arrangement is economically neutral to both 
parties if the cash deposit earns the same interest rate as the market rate of the depositor’s 
debt, and it avoids the often controversial use of selling protection on self or dealing in 
own debts for the purposes of hedging one’s own default and funding risk. An 
uncollateralized option is attainable, the option fair value V is arbitrage free, and risk 
neutral pricing still applies, so long as the risk neutral world covers the corporate bond 
markets. 
The liability-side pricing (LSP) theory developed therein represents the first no-
arbitrage pricing model that neatly integrates pricing of market risk, counterparty credit 
risk, and funding risk. It eliminates funding arbitrage opportunity, e.g., signing a full 
CSA or no CSA. Valuation adjustments can now be defined rigorously and consistently 
as price differences of the same model when input funding and credit curves are shifted. 
The so called coherent CVA and FVA add up to the precisely defined total counterparty 
risk adjustment (CRA), each corresponding to default risk and funding (or liquidity) risk. 
In the context of the un-concluding FVA debate, the coherent CVA and FVA definition 
offers advantages such as IFRS 13 compliance, observation of the law of one price, and 
no double counting of DVA and FVA. 
                                                 
2 Residue IR01 normally get an add-on market risk capital requirement in proportion to  IR01. 
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The theory’s application to swaps needs justification, as swaps don’t permit the 
kind of dynamic trading in underlying as stock options. This paper’s first contribution is 
to extend the liability-side pricing theory to uncollateralized swaps by setting up a 
dynamic hedge in CCP swaps where the notional of the swap hedge changes so that the 
uncollateralized swap’s interest rate sensitivity is fully hedged. This results in a partial 
differential equation (PDE) similar to the extended Black-Scholes-Merton PDE for 
options and proves that an uncollateralized swap can be dynamically replicated by CCP 
swaps. The open IR01 is plugged in and the same coherent CVA and FVA then applies to 
swaps.  
As is with most FVA and XVA formulations, coherent CVA and FVA is 
recursive in that the effective discount rate switches on the fair value itself. Finite 
difference (FD) schemes (Lou 2015b) are subject to the curse of dimensionality and 
ineffective at netting set levels. This paper’s second contribution is to devise a least-
square regression, Monte Carlo simulation scheme for the liability-side pricing model to 
decouple the recursion and to efficiently compute fair value, CVA and FVA, with 
numerical results verified by a FD solver.  
This paper proceeds with Section 2 briefly reviewing the main results of the 
liability-side pricing and conducting dynamic replication of Non-CCP swaps with CCP 
swaps. Section 3 then gives the key result of swap valuation in Proposition 1 with a proof 
in the Appendix and valuation adjustments. In section 4 we cover numerical techniques 
and build a mixed-normal-lognormal short rate model and the Black-Karasinski short rate 
model for the LIBOR rate to evaluate the impact of counterparty default risk and funding 
basis in the current low rate environment on swap pricing and valuation adjustments. 
Numerical results are presented in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Replicating an Uncollateralized Swaplet with a CCP Swaplet 
 
To begin, let’s review the main results of the liability-side pricing of 
uncollateralized stock option products. The option fair value V is governed by a modified 
Black-Scholes-Merton PDE with the option’s instantaneous rate of return at its liability-
side’s rate,  
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where re  is the effective discount rate switching between two counterparties’ 
rates rb and rc, )0)(()0)((  tVIrtVIrr cbe , rs the stock repo rate, q dividend yield, σ 
volatility, and S stock price. Equivalently, for an option expiring at T with payoff 
function H(T), the risk neutral pricing principle or formula is extended as follows, 
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Q is an equivalent martingle measure in a risk-neutral world that consists of the 
stock, the risk-free bank account, and the corporate bonds of the parties.  
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The dynamic hedging exercise employed to arrive at the above, however, works 
only for derivatives of tradeable underlying instruments. For interest rate swaps and 
derivatives, the underlying rate is not a tradeable instrument. Thanks to post-crisis market 
development, we could use CCP swaps as the hedging instruments for uncollateralized 
swaps. Indeed, FVA has been commonly introduced on a back-to-back hedge of an 
uncollateralized swap with a CCP swap, i.e., a static hedge. Here what we do differently 
is to have a dynamic hedging strategy to replicate an uncollateralized swap with a CCP 
swap and to extend the liability-side pricing principle to swaps. 
Consider a hypothetical dealer or bank (party B) and an uncollateralized customer 
(party C) enter into an interest rate swap (swap #1). The bank hedges the interest rate risk 
by continuously trading in an identical swap (swap #2) with a CCP member firm. Swap 
#1 has a unit notional and swap #2 a dynamic notional of Δt.  Δt becomes the swap hedge 
ratio. Back-to-back hedge is a simple case with Δt =1 for all t<=T. 
Swap #2 is fully collateralized in cash and is priced at the risk-free discount curve. 
Let V* denote the fair value of swap #2 per unit notional, Ls
 the collateral account balance 
under the CCP swap clearing agreement3, rL is the interest rate paid on Ls, then Ls=ΔtV*t , 
assuming that collaterals are maintained perfectly and continuously. 
For the time being, suppose swap #1 is a single reset (at T-ΔT), single payment (at 
T) swap or swaplet. Let Lt denote the mutually funded cash deposit balance. Write 
,

 ttt LLL  

tL  the cash amount posted (deposited) by party C to B that pays C’s 
cash debt interest rate rc(t), and 

tL  the cash collateral posted by B to C earning B’s 
interest rate rb(t).  Furthermore, the fair value of swap #1 is fully covered by the deposit
4, 
i.e., L=V. 
 Mt >=0 is the bank account balance that earns the cash deposit rate r. Nt>=0 is B’s 
short term debt (borrowing) account balance that pays par rate rN(t), rN(t)>=r(t). The 
wealth equation of the hedged swap economy reduces to the balance of the bank account 
and the debt account,  
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where 1-Γ is party B and C’s joint survival indicator. To fully replicate the pre-default 
portfolio, we set  π=0. Consequently both Mt  and Nt are set to zero, trivially. 
If the customer swaplet is a receivable to the bank, i.e., Vt>=0, the customer is 
indifferent to making a cash deposit to the bank in the same amount so long as the deposit 
earns its current market debt rate. Assuming a functioning debt market, the customer 
could raise that amount of the cash. Now if the bank defaults, the cash deposit as a 
receivable to C and the derivative as a payable to C set off and there is no default 
settlement. The same is true if C is default. From B’s perspective, the customer swaplet is 
financed by C’s deposit and its exposure to C is also hedged, see detailed arguments in 
Lou 2015a. 
                                                 
3 CCP default risk is secondary to no-CCP entities so we assume CCP non-defaultable in this exercise. 
CCP’s initial margin requirement related funding cost is considered separately.  
4 Any upfront payment V(0) can of course be used to actually fund the deposit, but the applicable interest 
rate is still rb(t) as it could otherwise be used to pay down B’s debt. 
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Because of the deposit from the liability side, the only account potentially subject 
to default settlement is the borrowing account Nt , which has balance zero under perfect 
replication. Suppose that the unit notional swap has a cumulative dividend process D(t), 
the pre-default financing equation is written as follows 
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Since swap #1 is a single period swap, dD=0 for t<T. If the interest rate ρ 
governing the swap payoff is modeled after a diffusion process under an equivalent 
martingale measure Q in a properly defined probability space {Ω,₲,P}, bdWadtd  , 
V* solves the following partial differential equation, 
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For simplicity, we have assumed all short rates are a function of ρ (for example, 
deterministic spread to ρ). Noting the above PDE and applying Ito’s lemma to Vt and V* 
lead to 
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This is the same PDE for uncollateralized options when drift and diffusion 
coefficients a and b are replaced with those of a stock’s lognormal price process in the 
risk neutral world. In fact, the extended option PDE can be derived alternatively by 
hedging an uncollateralized option with a CCP or exchange traded option and simply 
changing the dynamics of the short rate to that of the stock price.   
The terminal boundary condition is VT=V
*
T = DT, where DT is payoff of the 
swaplet at maturity T. As V*T is simply the terminal swap payment, enforcing the terminal 
condition guarantees that the hedge scheme produces the same swap cashflow as t 
approaches T. In fact, from VT=V
*
T , differentiate with respect to ρ, we have 
,
*
 



 TT VV  i.e. 1T , the swap hedge ratio is one on swap payment date. 
The one period uncollateralized swap is thus fully replicated, in both interest rate 
risk and cash flow, by dynamically trading a same term, same fixed rate swap with a CCP 
member firm. In other words, the uncollateralized swap (swap #1) is attained from a CCP 
swap delta hedge and a deposit under the liability-side pricing principle.   
 Finally by means of Feynman-Kac theorem, we have the familiar expected 
discounted payoff formula,  
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Zero coupon bond pricing can be treated as a special case by setting DT to 1. If the 
bond is issued by party C, then re = rc, or re = rb if by party B. The zero coupon bond is 
always priced at its issuer’s cash bond yield as the case should be. 
The framework outlined above works for caps and floors, and can be easily 
extended to price foreign exchange rate (fx) swaps and other rates and fx derivatives.  
  
3. Swap Valuation with Coherent CVA and FVA 
 
Heuristically, a swap of regular payment dates can be decomposed into a series or 
a portfolio of swaplets, each being replicated, in both risk and cash flow, by an identical 
CCP swaplet. At any given time t, each swaplet has its own hedge ratio, so the resultant 
portfolio of CCP swaplets is of non-uniform notionals on each payment date, therefore 
not a typical CCP swap. But this can be easily mapped into a portfolio of CCP swaps 
having stacked maturities and different notionals determined via a boot-stripping 
procedure.  In the end, the uncollateralized swap is attained by a portfolio of CCP swaps 
having different tenors and different notionals. The liability-side market funding, 
however, is provided at the portfolio level, on a netted basis.  
Let Ti denote the i-th payment time of the swap, δi swap payment at Ti, Vi the fair 
value of the i-th swaplet facing party C, we can write, 
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As t approaches Ti, Vi(t) approaches the cash payment itself with probability 1, if 
all short rates involved are continuous. In practice this is guaranteed as swaps are almost 
exclusively in-arrear. If we denote V*i(t) as the OIS discounted CCP swaplet, then we 
always have Vi(Ti)= V
*
i(Ti).  
From the PDE perspective, between payment dates, the same PDE would apply to 
each swaplet and thus to the swap as a portfolio of swaplets. On a payment date, one 
swaplet will drop out, creating a discontinuity for the swap fair value. Assuming a 
properly regulated swap payment or dividend process, the solution to the PDE can be 
summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 (Liability-Side Pricing of Uncollateralized Swaps): A bilateral cleared, 
uncollateralized swap’s no-arbitrage fair value is the expected risky discount of 
the swap’s net cashflow under the risk neutral measure Q, 
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The expectation taken under the risk neutral measure Q shows swap valuation by 
means of risky discounting of the cash flow. The discount rate, however, is switching 
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between the two parties based on the swap being a receivable or a payable locally in time. 
Duffie and Huang (1996) encounter a similar curve switching where the discount rate is 
0),>=1(Vs+0)<1(Vs+r BA  sA and sB are counterparty A’s and B’s CDS rates 
respectively, sA =(1-RA)*hA, sB =(1-RB)* hB, RA and RB A and B’s recovery rates on pre-
default market values with hA and hB as hazard rates in the risk-neutral world. The 
difference is that their switching is on the CDS rates while here it is on the cash rate, or 
full yield spreads when the risk free rate r is taken out, i.e., with the addition of the 
funding basis on top of the CDS rates. 
We could in fact incorporate a carrying cost (or benefit if negative npv) as a 
fraction of swap npv in Duffie and Huang’s model, with the same technical rigor, to 
arrive at the same swap valuation formulae (see Appendix for a proof of Proposition 1). 
The approach taken there is the classic reduced form, risk-neutral pricing approach for 
credit derivatives. In the above derivation, the risk neutral measure is only used to 
establish the pricing of fully collateralized or CCP swaps which the industry has 
consensus of applying the OIS curve as the risk free rate. The uncollateralized swap then 
is fully replicated by continuous trading in the CCP swap, without reference to the risk 
neutral default intensities and recovery rates. In typical credit derivatives pricing, the 
intensity or hazard rate is calibrated to CDS market, while the recovery rate is not market 
observable and set at some historical mean or by convention, for instance, 40% for 
investment grade credits. Note that a bond yield curve has no specification and no need of 
a recovery rate5. The liability-side pricing of uncollateralized swaps thus can be seen as 
an application or extension of the risk neutral pricing theory.   
In practice the risk neutral measure is calibrated to a series of standard market 
swaps, so the pricing of the uncollateralized swap connects directly to these market swaps.  
A popular interest rate risk hedge scheme is to use a product’s sensitivities to swap rates 
that constitutes the discount curve. The same scheme applies here. Specifically we could 
seek sensitivities of V(t) with respect to the OIS discounted swap curve and determine 
hedge ratios in each tenor. The advantage of such a scheme is that it does not depend on 
the factors that drive the curve. A bilateral uncollateralized swap is fully hedged by 
trading in CCP swaplets.  
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where Vi are the risky swaplet fair price. These swaplet hedge ratios can then be 
reverse boot-strapped into regular CCP swaps with staggered tenors. 
The total counterparty risk adjustment (CRA) to the counterparty default free fair 
value V* can be formulated exactly, 
 
                                                 
5 Reduced form models are distinguished in their specification by the use of an exogenously given recovery 
rate, commonly as a fraction of the face value or pre-default market value. The credit derivative markets 
responded with some not too successful initial efforts of developing a recovery swap market which 
basically disappeared after the financial crisis. Time to return to a bond like, recovery-rate-less model? 
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CRA is decomposed into bilateral CVA and FVA, in accordance to the 
decomposition of the credit spread into a default risk (CDS) component and a liquidity or 
funding basis. 
 
4. A Least-Square Regression/Simulation Liability-side Pricing Model 
 
The liability-side pricing principle nicely integrates derivatives’ market risk and 
counterparty credit risk in one formula, or one model. Except for pure asset or liability 
products such as a cap or floor which allow natural decoupling of the effective discount 
rate with the fair value, the expectation formula is of limited practical use as the effective 
rate depends on local fair value of the swap and numerical solutions have to be sought. 
On a trade level or option trading strategy that involves longs and shorts of 
options on the same underlying, a finite difference (FD) method is developed to solve the 
PDE for the fair value of the trade (Lou 2015b). As will be shown in this section, similar 
FD method can be developed for swaps or portfolio of swaps and rate derivatives when 
the underlying factors are very few. A derivatives netting set is an intrinsically high-
dimension portfolio, so pricing, CRA, CVA and FVA can only be done by Monte Carlo 
(MC) simulation. A particular challenge has been the often recursive nature of valuation 
adjustments. In the liability-side pricing model, the recursion happens only through the 
applicable discount factor and is different from other models, for example Burgard and 
Kjaer 2011, where the coupling binds the unknown fair value and its adjustment through 
some exposure amounts to be risk-free discounted.  
The aim of this section is to provide techniques to decouple the recursion and a 
starter implementation in both MC and FD where FD could be used to shed lights on 
funding cost’s impact on swaps pricing and valuation and to verify MC implementation. 
For illustrative purposes, the FD and MC implementations and computational results are 
based on a one-factor short rate model, either mixed-normal-lognormal model or the 
classic Black-Karasinski model. 
  
4.1 Short rate models 
CCP swaps are priced in dual curve settings where both the OIS curve and the 
LIBOR curve (or the LIBOR/OIS spread curve) are modeled. For illustrative purposes, 
we choose a one-factor LIBOR short rate model and leaves the risk free rate (OIS) r at a 
deterministic spread off the LIBOR short rate, ρ - r >=0, where ρ is the LIBOR short rate. 
As our focus is counterparty credit and funding risk, such a simple model could be 
adequate. Multi-factor short rate, HJM, and market models with joint modeling of the 
OIS rate and the LIBOR-OIS spread can be easily developed within the same simulation 
framework of the liability-side pricing model. 
In the current low rate environment, a normal short rate model such as the Hull-
White model has a significant part of short rate distribution in the negative territory and 
CIR model has difficulty calibrating to the markets. A recent improvement is to fit the 
volatility of the short rate as a function of the rate itself (DeGuillaume et al 2013). It is 
found that the short rate could be cut into three regions from zero rate to certain 
maximum rate. In the beginning and end regions, the rate’s volatility is approximately 
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linear to rate, while in the middle region, the volatility is about constant. The short rate is 
therefore locally lognormal except in the middle where it is normal (mixed-normal-
lognormal model or mixed model in short). Specifically write ,)()( dWrdtradrt    
where the volatility function is defined as  ,
015.0
)( 2
r
r   for r<0.015, 2)(  r  for 
0.06<r0.015  , and 2
06.0
)( 
r
r   for r≥0.06, with parameters estimation on 
historical data σ2=1.05%, a=0.05, θ=0.044 (Hull et al 2014). As a comparison, a mean-
reverting, lognormal model or Black-Karasinski (B-K) model is also implemented, 
,)( dWdtxdxt    )exp( tt xr  , where κ, µ, σ are positive constants.  
 
4.2. Decoupling techniques 
In the industry, CVA is computed via Monte Carlo simulations. The main 
obstacle of computing the LSP fair value is the discount rate switch that depends on the 
local fair value, i.e., the fair value equation is recursive. As the recursion only happens on 
the discounter factor, the coupling is a weak one, allowing approximations to take place. 
Consider a small time step [t, s), s=t+dt. V(t) is right-continuous-left-limit 
(RCLL), with its discontinuity reflecting discrete swap payment at time t. If dDt is the 
payment paid at time s, V(s_) is the left limit, then V(s_)=V(s)+dDt.  Applying 
conditional expectation at time t and s iteratively, we have the following one step 
valuation equation, 
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As dt is small, and V(t) is continuous in [t, s), our first approximation is to apply 
the indictor function and the rates at the beginning of the period, i.e., time t. The discount 
factor can then be taken out of the expectation to yield, 
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Notice that the discount factor is positive so V(t) has the same sign as _)]([ sVEQt , 
i.e., ).0_)]([()0)((  sVEItVI Qt Now V(t) is decoupled and can be computed directly 
from _)]([ sVEQt . 
If we fix the effective rate at the period end instead, the expectation can be 
evaluated directly, knowing the distribution of rates at s and V(s_). Since rates are only 
mildly diffusive, a further approximation is to use the rates at t but leave the switch at s. 
The following formula then results, 
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where V- is the negative part of V. A more generic approximation involving a 
weighted average of the effective rates at the beginning and end of the period can be 
developed similarly, if necessary.   
These one-step decoupling techniques can be used when local simulation is 
conducted or on a lattice or tree. 
 
4.3. Finite Difference  Solver 
A Crank-Nicholson FD scheme (Lou 2015b) is developed to cope with the free 
asset-liability boundary problem of an option trading strategy, where a projected 
successive over relaxation algorithm (PSOR) is used to handle the rate switch.  
For swaps, the discrete cash flows need special care. In between payment dates, 
the PDE applies while on payment dates, swap npv will jump in the amount of the 
payment. Duffie and Huang (1996) proposes a finite difference scheme to capture a 
swap’s reset and payment-in-arrears feature. The short rate on reset dates is treated as an 
auxiliary state variable which is fixed until the next reset. This enables the finite 
difference solver to run largely as a one-dimensional scheme, although limited in that it 
can only handle non-overlapping reset periods. It is not clear however how the rate 
switch is treated. Our FD solver incorporates discrete swap payments and resorts to 
simple iteration to make sure that the switch is compatible with the fair value.  
In order to capture the periodic floating rate payments, LIBOR rates have to be 
calculated. Unlike a CIR model where analytic formula exists for the price of zero 
coupon bonds, which can be used to convert the LIBOR short rate to 3 month LIBOR 
rate, the B-K model does not have an analytically tractable solution. An approximation 
technique developed by Xu (2014) is utilized to calculate the 3 month LIBOR rate given 
a grid of the LIBOR short rates. For the mixed-normal-lognormal model, we use the same 
FD solver to calculate 3 month zero coupon bond’s price and (pre)compute LIBOR rates 
for the short rate grid.  
 
4.4. LSP Simulation Model 
The discount rate switch is a binary category same as the early exercise condition 
of American option is: the latter compares a continuation value with a payoff value to 
determine whether the option is exercised or not, while the former compares the 
continuation value with value zero to determine which discount rate shall be used. 
Motivated by Longstaff and Schwartz (2001), we adopt a similar regression scheme to 
resolve the switch along with swap valuation.  
We set up a discrete time epoch t0 < t1 < t2 < … < tK=T. Introduce a switching 
matrix on all paths and time steps B(j,k), with value 0 indicating using rb and 1 rc, where j 
is the path index, and k =0, 1, 2, …, K is the time step index. Starting from maturity of 
the swap T, we know the pathwise net swap payments. Roll backward on the path from tK  
to tK-1 by discounting those positive with rc, or those negative with rb, to arrive at path 
value V(j,K-1). Next, apply least-square regression to V(ω,K-1) on given set of basis 
functions of short rates, ω representing all paths. The fitted value of the regression 
U(ω,K-1) is then used to set the switching matrix at tK-1 B(j,K-1). Now we add swap 
payment at tK-1 to V(ω,K-1) to arrive at V(j, tK-1-), then proceed with discounting V(j, tK-1-) 
with the discount rate decided based on the switching matrix (rather than the sign of 
V(ω,K-1)).  
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Specifically, the following procedure is developed as a starter implementation of 
coherent CVA and FVA computation, 
1.) Simulate the LIBOR short rates on a path, 
2.) Compute all relevant rates (synthetic rates and bond rates) as deterministic 
spreads to the short rate, 
3.) Starting from the longest maturity, determine swap payments as terminal fair 
value V(T), and U(T), 
4.) Initialize switching matrix B(T) to zero, and set to 1 where U(T) are positive, 
5.) At time step t+dt, Choose discount rates rc if U is switched on (with value 1), 
otherwise rb, 
6.) Discount V(t+dt) one time step to get V(t), 
7.) Perform least-square regression of V(t) with chosen basis functions, 
8.) Reval local fair value from the regression function to get U(t), 
9.) Update switching matrix B(t) based on U(t), 
10.) Add swap payments on t to V(t) and repeat. 
11.) Take the mean of V(0) and compute standard error.  
 
With regards to the basis functions, there are a good number of choices. For the 
results presented herein, a second order Laguerre polynomial is used. Higher orders and 
use of simple polynomial of order 2 or higher all produce basically the same results, 
although implementations shall experiment with their specific netting sets. Taking out the 
regression, the procedure reduces to a brute force MC simulation, which will be shown to 
be inaccurate. 
 The incremental decomposition of the total counterparty risk adjustment into 
CVA/DVA, FCA/FDA necessitates revaluation of swaps and derivatives under a 
different set of discounting curves. From Lou (2015a), if we write the portfolio pricer as 
V(fb,fc) where fb, fc are placeholders for the discount curves of party B and C respectively, 
then we have the following quantities linked to the pricer under different sets of curves, 
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),,~()~,~(
),~,~()~,(
),~,(),(
,)r,V(r-r)V(r,=U cb
cbcb
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The effective rate switch is still on the fair value to simplify the computation. This 
enables the simulation engine to roll back on time step simultaneously on these pairs of 
discount rates and compute all shifted prices at the same time. 
 
Multi-factor short rate, HJM, and market models with joint modeling of the OIS 
rate and the LIBOR-OIS spread can be easily accommodated within the simulation 
procedure. A FD solver incorporating discrete swap payments and iterative procedure to 
handle the rate switch is developed to verify the LSP simulation model. 
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5. Computational results 
 
For results presented below, the mixed-normal-lognormal model has the 
following parameters, a=0.21, σ2=2.52%, ρ0=0.18%, to calibrate to 3 month LIBOR of 
0.2887%, 5 year swap rate at 172.666 bp and 5 year ATM strike cap at yield value6 of 73 
bp. B-K model parameters are calibrated to the same LIBOR rate, swap rate and cap 
prices with µ=0.044, κ=0.2809, σ=0.8273, ρ0=0.25%. The LIBOR short rate and the risk-
free rate spread is assumed at recent 3 month Libor-OIS average spread of 13 bp. The full 
cash funding curves are assumed to be a deterministic spread above the LIBOR short rate 
or the risk-free short rate. For 10 year results, both models are calibrated to 10 y swap 
rate of 235.87 bp and 10 y cap with strike at ATM swap rate is 86.83 bp.  
 
5.1. Regression/Simulation vs FD  
To test the LSP simulation model, Table 1 lists a 10y ATM swap npv (in yield 
value) under the B-K model and the mixed model. Party B is set at LIBOR flat while C 
has a spread to B at 250 bp, 500 bp, and 1000 bp. The number of paths is 100,000, 
resulting standard error of swap npv is 0.1 bp. The time steps for both MC and FD are 
0.0125 years. As we can see, the difference (last row) between the FD and MC (3rd row, 
labeled LS-MC) is about few hundredths of a basis point. A brute force simulation 
without least-square regression (4th row), however, has significant errors. With the 
mixed-normal-lognormal model, when C’s spread to B is 250 bp, the error is 3.4 bp, 
which grows to 9.6 bp as C’s spread widens to 1000 bp. This shows that handling the rate 
switch with regression is essential for an accurate simulation of LSP pricing and CVA 
and FVA computation. 
  
Table 1. LSP simulation model verification with FD model for a 10y ATM swap under 
both the B-K model and the mixed model. 
 
B-K Model Mixed Model 
C-sprd 1000 500 250 1000 500 250 
FD -29.3137 -17.2979 -9.5196 -23.4533 -13.4788 -7.2889 
LS-MC -29.3227 -17.311 -9.5297 -23.4389 -13.4566 -7.2587 
MC -37.3454 -22.397 -12.3747 -33.0324 -19.5451 -10.6807 
Diff -0.009 -0.0131 -0.0101 0.0144 0.0222 0.0302 
 
5.2. Switch on net cashflow or net pv? 
 
Hubner (2001) popularizes a method of cash flow discounting first by segregating 
net cash inflow and net cash outflow and applies counterparty’s credit curve to net inflow 
and own credit curve to outflow respectively to get present values. The inflow pv and 
outflow pv are netted to arrive at the swap’s npv (net present value). This method is 
intuitive at the time and is similar to the liability-side pricing in that the discount curve 
switches between the counterparties’ credit curves. The difference is obvious as it 
switches on the sign of the net swap cash flow while LSP is on the sign of the swap npv.  
                                                 
6 A yield value is npv normalized by notional and annuity of the same term swap, in basis points. 
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This type of aggregation and discounting scheme is obviously flawed in theory. 
Consider, for example, a hypothetic swap of only one exchange of a payment at T and a 
receipt of the same amount at T-dT. If dT is zero, these two payments net out to zero so 
that the swap has zero npv. Now with a very small but non-zero dT, the receipt will be 
discounted at the counterparty’s rate rc while the payment will be at rb. Obviously when 
dT approaches zero, npv of the swap is not continuous and the gap7 is at the mercy of the 
relative credit spread rc-rb.  
As the method is quite popular with practitioners, it is interesting to see how 
much approximation error it could induce.   A payer (paying fixed, receiving float) swap 
decomposes into a long cap and a short floor. Long cap is the net inflow while the floor is 
the net outflow, so Hubner’s approach is equivalent to pricing the swap as a synthetic 
swap – a portfolio of long cap and short floor discounted at rc and rb respectively. Its 
price deviation from the swap npv reflects the portfolio netting effect. Table 2 shows the 
ATM payer swap, long cap, and short floor’s npv in yield value (bp) under the mixed 
normal and lognormal model. As C’s spread widens while keeping B’s at the risk free 
rate, the swap npv turns increasingly negative, reflecting the increased counterparty 
default and funding risk. At 250 bp, for instance, yield value of the swap is -3.3 bp. The 
floor yield remains the same (as is party B’s liability) but the cap yield drops to  67.4 bps 
so that cap minus floor is -6.2 bps, 2.9 bp difference from the swap npv solved directly 
from the FD solver, as shown in the last column. The netting effect is very significant, in 
the same magnitude as the swap npv. 
 
Table 2. ATM 5y swap (at 172.67 bps) priced under mixed-normal-lognormal model as 
compared to cash flow discounting of cap and floor.  
 
C-sprd swap-yld cap – floor cap yld floor yld Diff 
0 0.1 0.1 73.7 -73.6 0 
125 -1.6 -3.1 70.5 -73.6 1.5 
250 -3.3 -6.2 67.4 -73.6 2.9 
500 -6.5 -11.9 61.7 -73.6 5.4 
1000 -12.2 -21.8 51.8 -73.6 9.6 
2000 -21.3 -36.8 36.8 -73.6 15.5 
 
Deep in-the-money (ITM) swap is interesting in that it involves upfront funding. 
Table 3 shows an ITM receiver swap with strike at 500 bps (ATM swap rate at 172.67 
bp), under the B-K model. Swap npv is more sensitive to C’s spread widening. Swap npv 
yield, for example, drops 17.8 bp from 329.5 to 311.7 when C’s spread at 250 bps, 
compared to 3.3 bp drop for the ATM swap as shown in Table 2. The netting effect, 
while in the same magnitude as the ATM swap netting effect, is less pronounced 
comparing to the deep ITM npv. 
 
                                                 
7 As a numerical example under the BK FD model, where rb is at LIBOR while rc is 125 bps wider, 
applying Hubner’s discounting of cash flow at T=5 years would result in a npv of -5.725% of notional, 
while solving the LSP PDE would only give -0.223%. At 250 bps wider, Hubner’s results goes out further 
to -10.947%, while FD solution is little changed at -0.281%. 
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Table 3. Deep ITM 5y swap (at 500 bps) priced under the Black-Karasinski model as 
compared to cash flow discounting of cap and floor. 
 
C-sprd Swap npv flr-cap cap yld floor yld BK-Diff 
0 329.5 329.5 -27.3 356.8 0 
125 320.4 319.5 -27.3 346.8 0.9 
250 311.7 309.8 -27.3 337.1 1.9 
500 295.2 291.6 -27.3 318.9 3.6 
1000 265.8 259.1 -27.3 286.4 6.7 
2000 218.5 207 -27.3 234.3 11.5 
 
Although not accurate, switching on net cashflow allows a bank’s existing CVA 
infrastructure to migrate easily. For CVA and DVA based on expected positive and 
negative future exposure (EPE, ENE) simulation, the following is an approximation to 
coherent CVA and FVA, 
])exp()([
],)exp()()([
],)exp()([
],)exp()()([
dsdursENEEDFA
dsdursENErrEDVA
dsdursEPEECFA
dsdursEPErrECVA
T
t
s
t
bb
Q
t
T
t
s
t
bbb
Q
t
T
t
s
t
cc
Q
t
T
t
s
t
ccc
Q
t
 
 
 
 








 
where µb and µc are the funding basis of B and C respectively. 
 
5.3. Swap rate and CCP swap hedge ratios  
 
Swap pricing aims to determine a swap rate such that the swap npv is zero. Figure 
1 shows that the swap rate gradually declines from the risk free ATM rate of 172.7 bps to 
154.8 bps when party C’s credit spread widens to 10%.  The ATM swap rate initially 
declines at a rate of 1.8 basis point per 100 bps of C’s credit spread widening, reflecting 
elevated sensitivity in current interest rate environment which is very different from 
1990’s when both spot and historical interest rates are relatively high and Duffie and 
Huang (1996) report about 1 basis point increase in swap rate, given a typical CIR model 
with historical mean interest rate at 10%. 
 Swap delta or sensitivity to CCP swaps follows a similar pattern to the swap rate 
bid/ask spread. Figure 2 shows a decline from 1 to 0.85 and 0.81 for 5y ATM swap and 
ITM 5% receiver swap respectively. Initial rate of change is 2% drop per 100 bp 
widening under the mixed-normal-lognormal model. The hedge ratio of an OTM 5% 
payer swap is steady, only declining to 0.98, as there is little counterparty adjustment for 
party B is at LIBOR flat. 
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Figure 1. ATM swap rate bid and ask as counterparty’s credit spread widens. 
 
The switching effective rate naturally induces swap bid/ask spread. When the cash 
curves rb and rc are not identical, the PDE is position asymmetric, meaning that party B 
will see a receiver swap’s npv different from a payer’s npv. Consequently pricing the 
swap on the payer side will lead to a rate different from the rate on the receiver side, thus 
creating a bid/ask spread, in the same spirit as an option market maker’s funding cost 
creating an option bid and ask spread (Lou 2015b). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Uncollateralized or Non-CCP swap hedge ratio decreases as party C’s spread 
widens to LIBOR where B is at. 
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Fixing B’s credit spread to OIS at 125 bps and C’s relative spread to B at 125 bps 
leads to a bid of 167.27 bps and ask of 170.22 bps, a spread of 3 bps. The bid and ask 
further diverge as C’s relative spread increases, resulting in wider bid/ask spread. The 
bid/ask spread is 22.44 bps, for example, when C has a spread of 1000 bps, 
 
5.4. Swap CRA and decomposition results   
 To demonstrate, we set Party B’s CDS (zero recovery rate) short rate to 75 bps 
and its funding basis 50 bps on top of LIBOR, approximated single ‘A’ rated.  C’s spread 
to LIBOR varies from 37.5 to 1000 bp, roughly reflecting credit rating range of 
“AAA/AA+” to “B”. C’s funding basis are 15, 30, 50 bp for the first three ‘rating’s and 
80 bp for the rest. All values in Table 4 and 5 are yield values in bp computed by the LSP 
simulation model.  
For the ATM receiver swap, DVA and DFA are larger, intuitively due to greater 
negative exposure. 
 
Table 4. 10y ATM payer swap valuation adjustments under the mixed model with a 
single ‘A’ rated dealer facing a counterparty of hypothetic ‘AAA/AA+’ to ‘B’ rating. 
 
C-Libor "Rating" NPV CRA CVA DVA CFA DFA 
37.5 AAA/AA+ -0.45 0.84 1.13 0.49 0.47 0.27 
75 AA/AA- -1.58 1.97 1.83 0.5 0.91 0.27 
125 A -3.05 3.44 2.75 0.5 1.47 0.28 
250 BBB -6.5 6.87 5.52 0.53 2.18 0.3 
500 BB -12.6 12.98 12.05 0.59 1.86 0.34 
1000 B -22.37 22.76 22.52 0.74 1.4 0.42 
 
Table 5. 10y ITM 5% receiver swap valuation adjustments under the mixed model with a 
single ‘A’ rated dealer facing a counterparty of hypothetic ‘AAA/AA+’ to ‘B’ rating. 
 
C-Libor "Rating" NPV CRA CVA DVA CFA DFA 
37.5 AAA/AA+ 260.52 4.9 3.79 0.3 1.58 0.17 
75 AA/AA- 256.64 8.79 6.15 0.3 3.1 0.16 
125 A 251.59 13.84 9.25 0.3 5.05 0.16 
250 BBB 239.61 25.82 18.7 0.29 7.56 0.15 
500 BB 218.12 47.31 41.17 0.26 6.54 0.14 
1000 B 183.29 82.14 77.53 0.22 4.95 0.12 
 
The CRA of the ITM swap when C’s spread to LIBOR is 47.3141 solved from the 
Crank-Nicolson FD solver, compared to 47.3001 bp from simulation. This again shows 
the satisfactory accuracy of the LSP simulation model. 
 
 While the results are given on a single trade or a simple portfolio, LSP pricing 
applies at the counterparty or firm level to allow netting of funding in a whole derivatives 
portfolio. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
By constructing a dynamic CCP swap hedge, an uncollateralized swap is shown 
to be fully replicated, allowing no-arbitrage pricing of swaps subject to counterparty 
default and funding risk. The open IR01 of a back-to-back, static hedge is plugged in and 
there is no need of market risk capital add-on. Swap valuation follows the same liability-
side pricing principle established for stock options, and the total counterparty risk 
adjustment is the cost of financing the CCP swap mark-to-market from the liability-side 
counterparty’s perspective, leading to coherent definition of bilateral CVA and FVA.  
Computation of fair value and CVA and FVA involves solving a recursive 
expectation due to LSP model’s distinct discount rate switch. A least-square 
regression/simulation scheme is devised to compute CVA, DVA, CFA (FCA), and DFA 
(FBA) simultaneously, and is found indispensable as brute force MC simulation produces 
large errors. Preliminary results from calibrated mixed-normal-lognormal short rate and 
Black-Karasinski models show that for moderate credit spread, swap rate can change by 
about 2 bp in current rate environment and that the swap hedge ratio deviates away from 
1-to-1 by about 2% with each 100 bp difference in counterparties’ credit spreads. LSP 
naturally applies to counterparty netting or firm funding set level, so long as an 
implementation could accommodate other rate models and products, a topic to be 
explored in the future for an industry strength implementation of coherent CVA and FVA. 
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1 
  
 Following Duffie and Huang (1996)’s notations, the cumulative dividend process 
of the swap for counterparty A under the liability side market funding principle (Lou 
2015a) is defined by, 
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where Ht  is same as our Γ, St is the market value of the swap, Dt is the natural swap 
cumulative payment process without consideration of counterparty default. Note here we 
are only paying the spread above the risk free rate out of the swap cash flow as the 
deposit would earn the risk free rate return.  
 Under the equivalent martingale pricing measure, the swap market value is 
 
],|)exp([ ts
T
t
s
tQt
FdXrduES    
 
Substituting Xt into the above, we obtain 
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where ))(0(1))(0(1 rrSrrS AtBtt   is the effective short rate spread.  
Noting that  ,)}({1 t
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tt dMdthhtdH   where h are the hazard rates of 
party A and B respectively, M is a Q-martingale per Doob-Meyer decomposition. 
Differentiate the above to arrive at, 
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where ttt rR  . The rest follows Appendix A (Duffie and Huang 1996). This 
proof shows that the same pricing measure for the CCP swaps is unaltered in order to 
price the uncollateralized swaps, contrary to Kenyon and Green’s (2014) argument. 
 
